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1 Case No. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
THE HONORABLE HENRY ,
1 
10730 
HUGGER!, DISTRICT JUDGE, ) 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF 
AN EXTRAORDINARY 'VRIT IS AN 
AYAILABLE REMEDY TO ISSUE 
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT 
The plaintiff submits that the defendant's conten-
lion that an extraordinary writ is not aYailable in the 
instant ease, is not well taken. The posture of this 
Lase dearl~, supports the issuance of an extraordinary 
writ. 
1 
The plaintiff seeks prosecution of C. ,V. "Buck'. 
Brady on the charge of first degree perjury.(t) The 
perjury was allegedly committed during his testimony 
before a grand jury convened in Salt Lake County i~ 
1965. Subsequent to an indictment being returned 
1 
against Mr. Brady, he filed a motion to suppress the 
testimony given before the grand jury because of a 
claimed violation of his constitutional rights. After 
considering the issues, the defendant granted Brady's 
motion to suppress the evidence of the perjury. The 
order to suppress effectively precluded any further 
prosecution because the very evidence of the perjury 
could not be used. The legal import of the court's order 
was to dismiss the case. The District Attorney of the 
Third J udical District then proceeded two ways. The 
first was to appeal from the defendant's order and the 
second to apply to this court for an extraordinary writ 
to review the defendant's decision. It seems well settled 
that an appeal may not be taken from an order that is 
not final. Section 77-39-4 Utah Code Annotated, 1953; 
People v. Hill, 3 Utah 334, 3 Pac. 75 ( 1884). Decisions 
from the United States Supreme Court have ruled that 
orders on motions to suppress were not appealable by 
the government since they were not final. Caproll v. 
Umted States, 354 U.S. 394 ( 1957) ; Di Bella v. United 
States, 369 U.S. 121 (1962). In Cipes, Moore's Federal 
Practice, Vol. 8, p. 41-30 comments as to this situation: 
"While a defendant whose motion to suppress 
is denied may raise the point on appeal in the ; 
----
( 1) This charge is different than the prosecution on a similai 
charge now on appeal before the court. 
2 
court of conYiction, if the motio11 is granted the 
goyernment may be cffectiYely foreclosed from 
prose<:uting if all or substantially all of its evi-
dence is suppressed." 
See also, Cipes, suprn P 12.05 [2] p. 12-27. 
There is nothing to suggest that in this case the 
position of the State of U tall is any different. 
Cipes, suz;ra notes that under these circumstances 
the right to mandamus may be appropriate. Cipes, 
Moore's Pederal Practices, Yol. 8, ~ 12.05 (2] p. 12-29. 
In United States v. Igoe, 331 F. 2d 766 (7th Cir. 1964) 
the Seventh Circuit granted a writ of mandamus against 
a trial judge who wrongfully dismissed the gm"ernment 
ease under circumstances where the decision was not 
appealable.U) The Government's prosecution was ef-
fel'tiwly thwarted and the court determined under such 
circumstances a writ of mandamus would be available. 
The court observed: 
"'Vith respect to the issuance of a writ of 
mandamus, on the other hand, we have considered 
all arguments a<lYanced in opposition to it and 
find them unconvincing. 'Ve believe that the writ 
must be granted here. The District Court is di-
rected to reinstate this case and set it for trial." 
.T udge Schnackenberg, in his concuring opinion, 
noted: 
121 ~Pe Cipc'S. Moore's F:'deral P1·aci.ic:~. Vol. 8. CJ 1205 : 21. 
131 [n. 1''1ote 73 Har. L. Re\· 1036. 1399 (1960) i. is wisely ob-
:wrved: ·"Fu rthermo:-c \: se'.: m~· the ? ppell2 l 2 ju ,·i.c.rlictior 
'hould expand as th0 powc1· 0£ 1hc distric' >:our:.· •O dismis~ 
1~ enlarged, in order to m'-lin!3in adeqm1"e sup2, .. v·is;on cvc1 
Ilic lower court." 
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"In answer to a contention of defendant that 
neither by appeal or mandamus can the govern-
ment secure a review by this court of the dis-
missal of the instant case for want of prosecu· 
tion. I wish to add that this question is to be 
determined not by its form but by its substance.'' 
Applying the above reasoning to the circumstances i 
of this case it is clear that the substance of the defend- . 
ant's order would effectively terminate the prosecution 
of Mr. Brady. Under these circumstances it was tanta· 
mount to a dismissal of the charges. The public as well 
as the defendant, has a right to substantial justice, and 
the prosecution of a case should not be arrested because 
the trial court has acted erroneously. Under such cir· 
cumstances review by extraordinary writ is allowable. 1 
In this case the defendant did not purport to enter 
his order as a matter of discretion, but concluded that 
sound constitutional principles dictated such a result. 
The case and authorities relating to the unavailability 
of mandamus or like writs to review discretionary acts 
are, therefore, inapplicable since this case does not pre· 
sent a situation where the evidence was of a nature that 
the trial court could admit or exclude in its discretion 
and the Court did not purport to so rule. In 35 Am. J ur. 1 
Mandamus§ 294, it is observed: 
"Mandamus will issue, also, to compel the co~rt 
to reinstate a criminal case, discontinued or dis-
missed for reasons insufficient in law." 
The above rules have substantial support in case 
law from this court. 
4 
In the early case of People v. Van 1~assel, 13 Utah 
9, 43 Pac. 625 ( 1896) a justices court dismissed a peti-
tion and after application for mandamus to the district 
court, the Territorial Supreme Court held mandamus 
was applicable to compel the court to accept jurisdiction 
and try the cause. In State e.v rel Neilson vs. Third 
Judicial District Court, 36 Utah 223, 102 Pac. 868 
(1909) this court ruled mandamus was applicable to 
review the arbitrary dismissal of case. 
In Hanson v. Iverson, 61 Utah 172, 211 Pac. 682 
(1922) this court held mandamus applicable to review 
a dismissal where the trial court ruled it had no juris-
diction as a matter of law. In State v. Second District 
Court, 36 Utah 396, 104 Pac. 282 (1909) a writ of 
mandamus was denied the District Attorney from the 
dismissal of an action, but only after the court reviewed 
the substance of the application and found it insufficient 
on the merits and that, therefore, mandamus was in-
applicable. Therefore, treating the substance of this 
case, rather than form, it is clear mandamus is an ap-
propriate remedy. 
In addition certiorari would be an appropriate 
remedy if the defendant exercised his discretion and 
abused the exercise as plaintiff submits occurred. Rule 
65 B(b) (2) U.R.C.P. provides certiorari is available 
"lw ]here an inferior tribunal ... or officer exercising 
judicial functons has ... abused its discretion;." See 
rtlso lli,qgins v. Burton, 64 Utah 550, 232 Pac. 915 
(1924). 
5 
Obviously, the extraordinary writ is available in 
this case to compel the defendant to accept jurisdicti011 
and proceed to trial. 
ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY 
The plaintiff wishes to call to the Court's attentiou 
two relevant authorities not noted in the plaintiff's 
initial brief. 
In Sobel, The New Confession Standards, Miranda 
v. Arizona ( 1966) the Honorable Nathan R. Sobel, 
Justice of the Supreme Court, Kings County, New 
York, discusses the application of Miranda in the con-
text of a grand jury. He notes the New York rule on 
appearance before grand juries and states: 
"The federal courts do not follow this minority 
view. In the federal courts, a subpoena is not 
'compulsion.' Therefore, a de facto 'witness' or 
'target' or a de jure defendant may be sub-
poenaed before the grand jury and unless a 
claim of privilege is made, any testimony ob-
tained may be used at the trial." 
This clearly acknowledges that as yet the federal 
rule nor the Federal Constitution require the result 
reached by the defendant. 
In an article, September 26, 1966, the Grand Jmy: 
Protection Against the State or Prosecutor's Rubber 
Stamp, New York Times, p. 44, the nature of the Ne\\' 
York Grand J nry system is discussed and it is note<l 
6 
the New York Constitution requires a grand jury in-
dictment for a felony. Thus, a "target" situation can 
exist if the indictment put before the Grand Jury 
naming the defendant results in his also being called 
as a witness. This is not the case in Utah. The New 
York cases are therefore of limited value. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted this court should issue 
au extraordinary writ requiring the defendant to admit 
the excluded evidence and to proceed to trial in the case 
of State v. Brady. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JAY ELMER BANKS 
District Attorney 
Third Judicial District 
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